On the optimal allocation of green-technologies under climate change agreements by Schüller, David
 On the optimal allocation of 
green-technology under climate 
change agreements 
 
David Schüller 
 
Master Thesis for the Master of Philosophy Degree in Environmental 
and Development Economics 
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO 
May 2009 

 Preface 
 
Without even so much as a bit of reasonable doubt, this thesis would not 
have reached completion in time if it weren’t for the superb supervising 
efforts of my thesis advisor Karine Nyborg. Comments arrived promptly and 
were always informative and helpful. Encouragements were handed out as 
well as warnings when necessary. When being caught up in last-minute 
details an eye was kept on overall picture. All this allowed me to get more 
than a glimpse at the world of research and for that I am deeply thankful.  
Most of the research and writing was done at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute 
from which I gratefully acknowledge the generous scholarship received. At 
the institute, I would first and foremost like to thank Steinar Andresen for 
making my stay there possible, showing interest in my project and most 
insightful comments from a political science perspective. I would also like to 
thank all the other Master students and researchers at the institute for 
continued encouragements, most enjoyable lunch sessions and input 
concerning my research. Also, I thank Mads Greaker and Cathrine Hagem 
from SSB for providing me with papers that greatly helped me to unravel the 
CDM and games with asymmetric players.  
I also thank my dear friend Ricardo Duque for having suffered through 
British boarding school so that I could profit from his great editorial skills.  
Last but never least, I would like to thank my family and friends for allowing 
me to escape from my thesis every now and then, offering me much needed 
social distractions.  
All remaining errors are my own.  
 
 
David Schüller 
May 2009, Oslo
  
Abstract  
This thesis investigates if a technology transfer mechanism can help to reach a 
cooperative outcome, in a game on a climate change treaty that involves emission 
caps for both developed and developing country. A climate change treaty without 
the inclusion of developing countries and their acceptance of emission limits is likely 
to be ineffective. Too little research and development of green-technology is 
currently undertaken, considering its potentially global impact especially in 
developing countries. Analysing a simple game with two asymmetric players, a 
tentative result is that the technology transfer mechanism considered here cannot 
help to establish the cooperative outcome as a Nash-equilibrium. However, the 
inclusion of secondary benefits in the payoff function, which are likely to occur when 
such a transfer takes place, could change this result.    
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1. Introduction 
”Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; 
because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, 
that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning the 
whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand 
persons shou’d agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so 
complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each 
seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and wou’d lay the whole 
burden on others“ (Hume 1740, p.538) 
 
The problem of organization of cooperative effort among a large number of people 
described above by the great philosopher David Hume is a most basic one which 
has re-occurred countless times throughout human history. Tribes needed to 
organize their daily activities so that everyone is fed in the evening without being 
able to control the effort of all members at all times. During the First World War, 
soldiers stuck in trench warfare who were opposing each other for extended periods 
found a mutual agreement, finally without tacit cooperation, which allowed both 
sides to survive for some time (Ashworth 1980; Axelrod 1984). Though cooperation 
got initially started verbally, this was quickly suppressed by superiors. Without this 
mean to establish cooperation, each battalion would fire at the same spot at the 
same time each day so that the other side could prepare and eventually reciprocate. 
This system was later broken-up by raids, which made it impossible to leave the 
enemy unharmed. In modern day large scale companies the employer must find 
ways to induce workers to exert their best effort even if the employer does not 
possess the information, what level this is and has no legal way of obtaining such 
information. 
 What about cooperation on an aggregate level such as cooperation among 
nations? Whereas such cooperation on an international scale in the past was often 
limited to a few nations with a clear goal, for example the defeat of Nazi Germany or 
lowering trade barriers simultaneously; issues that require international cooperation 
today tend to be inherently more complex rendering cooperation often difficult to 
achieve. In the case of the depletion of the Ozone layer cooperation succeeded via 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and later 
amendments.  
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The problem that arguably currently looms darkest on humanity’s horizon is 
the issue of global climate change. Scientific consensus today points towards 
human activity as one of the main drivers of this change (Stern 2007; IPCC 2007a). 
To be clear, the science is still riddled with uncertainties. But though it is sound, 
science does not always translate well into action. In his book “Predictably Irrational 
- the hidden forces that shape our decisions” Dan Ariely (2008) describes a series of 
experiments where people, when giving the opportunity tend to cheat, at least a 
little. More importantly, they tend to cheat a lot when money is not involved directly. 
Even if the tokens that they receive for the outcome of an experiment where 
exchanged seconds later into money, the rate of cheating increased dramatically 
compared to receiving money directly. Concerning the issue of international climate 
change negotiations this insight from psychology is a saddening one. States are 
sovereign and cannot be forced by others to adhere to an agreement or to pay fees 
for non-compliance, offering room to “cheat”. A cap-and-trade system of green-
house gas emissions is seen by many as the vital component of any such 
international agreement. But such a system, by removing money as a direct medium 
of exchange, may then drastically increase the chances of states cheating one 
another, or not engaging in any sort of cooperation at all. Within the issue of climate 
change this incentive is even more pertinent as one state might profit more from 
cooperating than not if all others cooperate, but the benefits are even higher if all but 
him cooperate, creating a powerful incentive to free-ride.   
There are, however, some silver linings on the horizon. The Montreal 
Protocol succeeded after all and many have looked to it for guidance. Nations tend 
to stick to agreements if they are “self-enforcing” (Barrett 1994), providing an overall 
benefit to a country. Furthermore, whereas many games of cooperation assume 
players to be symmetric, they certainly are asymmetric when it comes to climate 
change. These asymmetries boost the impact that side-payments, monetary or non-
monetary, can have on cooperation.  
Many argue that technology should play a more important role than it does 
today to combat human induced climate change. More specifically, technology 
transfer to countries that do not possess the technical skills to develop them locally 
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but will be responsible for much of the increase in emissions in the future will be 
important.   
The first question this thesis seeks to address is if such a technology transfer 
scheme is already in place. A tentative result is that there is no such mechanism in 
place. The logical question to ask is then what such a mechanism could look like. 
Finally, this thesis will address the issue if such a transfer can increase cooperation 
as a side-payment in a new climate change treaty. 
 The next section will lay the theoretic foundations for the following analysis. 
It will offer an introduction of environmental-, resource-, development economic 
literature that is related to the issue of technology transfer, research and 
development of technology, and climate change. One part will also be concerned 
with literature on international cooperation and game theory. All parts together 
should constitute a theoretic basis on which to build an effective climate change 
agreement. 
In the third section the Kyoto protocol will be analyzed based on the 
economic foundations from chapter one in order to see if it was effective to address 
the issue of climate change. The three mechanisms of the protocol will receive 
special attention, as they are the only part of the protocol that addresses technology 
transfer in some fashion. Section four contains an analysis of the Asian Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development, especially with respect to recent literature in 
resource economics.  
In section five the main contribution of this thesis will be introduced, a largely 
self-conceived technology transfer mechanism under a new climate change 
agreement with abatement requirement for both developed and developing 
countries. The mechanism will be analyzed in section six with a simple game with 
asymmetric players to explore the most important frictions it will face when trying to 
increase cooperation in a climate change agreement. Chapter seven concludes.  
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2. Theory and Background  
2.1 Public goods, a global stable climate and R&D 
A pure public good is commonly defined by two properties: Non-excludability and 
non-rivalry (Perman et al., 2003). Non-excludability means that no one can be 
excluded from the consumption of a good. Non-rivalry implies that consumption by 
one agent does not come at the expense of the consumption by another agent. The 
classical example of such a good is national defense. No resident of a country can 
be excluded from its consumption, as in being protected from foreign and domestic 
foes. Furthermore, consumption by one resident however defined in the context of 
defense, does not preclude others from being defended. In the case of defense, all 
agents have an incentive not to contribute to its provision since once it is available 
they do not have to pay any additional fee to enjoy the consumption of it. States can 
overcome this behavior by levying taxes on its citizens and punishing tax evasion 
severely. 
 All public goods have inherent externalities that would lead to their under 
provision, if left to market outcomes without a regulation agency. Externalities can 
also occur in the case of private goods. In general: “An external effect, or externality, 
is said to occur when the production or consumption decisions of one agent have an 
impact on the utility or profit of another agent in an unintended way” (Perman et al. 
2003, p.134).  
This thesis is mainly concerned with the global public good nature of a stable 
climate. Consumption of a stable climate has been non-rivalrous for most of human 
history as consumption of stable weather by, for example, an American farmer does 
not preclude their European counterparts to enjoy a largely predictable season that 
allows them to plan their harvest and planting cycles. This line of argumentation 
implies that a stable climate can be seen as natural capital in the process of 
production (Perman et al. 2003). Without a stable climate humanity would find it 
hard to exist and production of any goods would be difficult. Also, non-excludability 
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is given as it is up until now technically impossible to “restrict” the usage of a stable 
climate in a specific region in the world.  
With the advent of the industrial revolution humanity started to emit massive 
amounts of climate relevant gases into the atmosphere, notably CO2. This 
happened without taking into account the negative effects that this might have on a 
global stable climate. The first to mention that human activity might have an impact 
on the climate was Baron Jean-Baptiste Fourier in 1827 (Fourier 1827). A first 
estimate of the exact magnitude of this impact was published by Svante 
Arrenhenius in 1896 (Arrhenius 1896). “The first official recognition came from the 
US President’s Science Advisory Committee in 1965 when, amongst other things, it 
noted that climate change could be caused by human activities and could have 
important consequences” (Agrawal 1998, p.606). In the second half of the 1970s the 
argument was advanced that more CO2 emissions would actually lead to a cooling 
(IPCC 2007a). This was later refuted and it was found that it were in fact aerosols 
that were emitted alongside CO2 that were responsible for this phenomenon. “95% 
of all the climate change science literature since 1834 was published after 1951” 
(IPCC 2007a, p.98). Climate gases once emitted, stay in the atmosphere for a long-
time, about 25% is likely to stay in the atmosphere indefinitely (Archer 2005). This 
makes climate relevant emissions a stock pollution problem in that if more 
emissions are released than naturally decay, the stock of emissions increases. 
Emissions by one country do not only impact its own climate but have a global 
effect, since it is the accumulation of greenhouse gases worldwide that changes the 
climate. This makes the problem of human induced climate change a transboundary 
environmental problem. There is current scientific consensus that if the emission 
concentration surpasses 550ppm CO2 the increase in global temperatures will be 
beyond the critical level of 2 degrees by the middle of the century (Stern 2007). 
Costs in terms of forgone economic growth and damages would in this case most 
likely be substantial. Optimally then, to preserve a stable climate and to avoid the 
loss of economic growth in the future, emission levels should not reach this level 
taking the natural rate of decay into account.  
As the negative stock externality that climate gases have has not been 
sufficiently taken into account so far by polluting agents, a variety of interventions 
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can be applied to internalize this effect. For example, by levying a tax on the usage 
of fossil energy, the cutting of rain forests and other climate gases related activities. 
The optimal level of greenhouse gas emission can be fine-tuned by the tax, as this 
makes emissions more expensive. Market mechanisms should then lead to a 
substitution away from production inputs that emit greenhouse gases. Allocating 
emission permits to all countries at a level that would avoid drastic climate change is 
the second common solution offered by environmental economic theory. This would 
establish a shadow-price on the usage of fossil fuels in terms of abatement cost. By 
allowing permit trade to take place, the marginal cost of abatement would be 
equalized globally rendering this an efficient solution (Perman et al. 2003). But for 
most of the time since the industrial revolution began these options have been 
safely ignored, either due to non-awareness of the stock nature of the problem or 
the absence of international cooperation which will be discussed in more detail 
below.  
The second important externality issue related to climate change concerns 
the research and development (R&D) of technologies that help to adapt or mitigate 
climate change. The output of R&D is knowledge. Knowledge in economic theory is 
commonly classified as a pure public good. Once produced, no one can be 
excluded from acquiring it without further protective measures such as patents that 
credit the inventor. Usage of knowledge by one person does not preclude others 
from using it, making it non-rivalarous. Knowledge is then produced at a socially 
sub-optimal level as producers cannot recover their investment as no one is willing 
to pay for something that is available for free (Jaffe et al. 2005). To overcome this 
problem, producers of knowledge are granted patents that allow them to restrict 
access to knowledge and thus recover their investment.  
Concerning the issue of R&D related to global environmental problems, Hoel 
(2005) shows that if countries only consider the impact that R&D has on their own 
economy whereas the real effect is global, R&D levels on climate technology are 
sub-optimal. Without an international agreement, countries will only equate the 
marginal benefit of R&D with the marginal environmental costs within their own 
borders. But R&D can lower abatement costs globally. Climate technology might still 
reach other countries due to spill-over effects, but this is a second best outcome as 
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countries will not take this into account when considering on their level of R&D 
expenditure.  
Technological spill-overs can also reduce the “leakage” effect which occurs 
when not all countries are part to an international agreement that specifies binding 
emission reductions (Golombek and Hoel 2005). Reduced demand for inputs that 
emit greenhouse gases when used in a country or sector lowers the international 
price of these production inputs. The reduced price will then create the incentives for 
those countries or sectors affected by the agreement to increase their use of the 
good, increasing emission levels and lowering thereby the effectiveness of any such 
agreement. Addressing the two issues of global public goods described can only be 
achieved via international cooperation. Reasons for the absence of cooperation and 
ways to improve the likelihood of it are discussed in the next section.  
2.2 International cooperation 
Solving transboundary issues of pollution requires cooperation from at least two 
states, in the case of climate change cooperation from most of the world (Stern 
2007). In contrast to pollution issues that happen within the borders of a state, there 
is no agency that can force states to adhere to agreements made between them 
unless they delegate that role to an international agency and decide to give up 
sovereignty. In the case of human induced climate change this has not happened so 
far. Agreements must then be “self-enforcing” if they are to be effective (Barrett 
1994; Wagner 2001). Agreements are self-enforcing when two conditions are 
fulfilled. First of all, the payoff for a country must not be driven below the non-
cooperative level. Secondly: “… the agreement (must) not be vulnerable to free-
riding and deviant behavior by individual countries or sub-coalitions of countries.” 
(Wagner 2001, p.384). It is then said to be a stable agreement as participation is the 
best alternative for the member.  
However, the incentive to cooperation may decrease the more countries are 
part to an agreement. It usually pays for countries to cooperate as compared to non-
cooperation, but it pays even more if everybody else continues to cooperate and 
one country leaves the agreement: “The larger are the potential gains to 
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cooperation, the greater are the benefits of free-riding and so the larger are the 
incentives to defect” (Perman et al. 2003, p.310).  
This is similar to the outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma game. In this one-shot 
game, the payoff for cooperation to both players is higher than the payoff for 
defection by both parties, but the highest payoff is obtained when one player defects 
and the other cooperates, the defecting one receiving the larger payoff. As both 
have an incentive to defect, none of them can be assured of cooperation in a non-
cooperative setting. The Nash-equilibrium is then defection by both players. A more 
formal analysis of this will be given in chapter five. Assuming that countries act as 
rational players in the case of an international agreement on climate change this will 
lead to a low number of signatories as they expect defection which in turn 
decreases their benefit from cooperation. The problem of human induced climate 
change is a good example of this scenario with some special properties. Since it is a 
global stock problem, the benefits of one country abating are spread to all countries, 
which implies that one country is not able to appropriate completely the benefits of 
its own abatement. Furthermore, the benefits are only occurring in the future which 
reduces the benefit of abating today even further when taking discounting into 
account.  
Free-riding can also be a problem in treaties even if they have a high level of 
participation. A consensus treaty is self-enforcing and has a high level participation, 
but the abatement level that signatories have to fulfill is below the cooperative 
outcome (Barrett 1999). A treaty of this kind is designed to get as many countries on 
board as possible, but comes at the price of lowering abatement levels to a point 
that everyone can agree on. In this scenario all signatories are collectively free-
riding. In order to move from this impasse the benefits of cooperation must increase 
while the cost of defecting must to do so as well.  
The economic development of all rich economies today has been heavily 
reliant on the use of fossil fuels without the before mentioned externality priced into 
their usage. In 1994 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) entered into force when more than 50 parties had ratified it, which was 
agreed upon at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. To this date 192 countries have 
ratified the convention. By signing, countries took on a "non-binding aim to reduce 
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atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases with the goal of "preventing 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth's climate system." 1 The 
convention also specified that developing countries would not have to re-structure 
their economies away from reliance on fossil fuels unless developed countries 
would provide sufficient funds and technology. This concept has also been 
embedded in the Kyoto Protocol which entered into force in February 2005.In it, 
member parties endorse the “common but differentiated” approach which puts the 
burden of financing mitigation and adaptation on industrialized countries 2Most of 
the increase in emissions in the future will be coming from developing countries. 
The effort of developed countries alone, as specified in the Kyoto Protocol, will not 
be sufficient to stabilize emissions at a non-critical level or only does so at a 
prohibitively high cost (Stern 2007).  
Another way of increasing the benefits of accession to an agreement is via 
side-payments, commonly referred to as “carrots”. Side-payments have been shown 
to be particularly powerful if there is asymmetry between nations: “The conventional 
wisdom that self-enforcing IEAs (International Environmental Agreements) can not 
achieve substantial gains when the gains to cooperation are large does not hold 
when nations are asymmetric” (McGinty 2006, p.4). Intuitively, asymmetry allows for 
larger transfers of wealth than symmetric conditions. These transfers can help to 
increase cooperation.  
Asymmetry in the context of climate change can be linked to at least three 
dimensions. Firstly, the marginal costs of abatement differ substantially among 
countries with developed countries having relatively high costs and developing 
countries having relatively low costs (Ellerman et al. 1998; Nordhaus 1998). 
Secondly, the level of R&D activity related to green-technology. This issue will be 
discussed at length in the next section, but the main result that emerges is that 
green technology is largely developed in rich democracies. Finally, developing 
nations are likely to suffer more from damages than developed ones (Stern 2007; 
IPCC 2007b).  
                                              
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Framework_Convention_on_Climate_Change 
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McGinty (2006) focuses on the first asymmetry and suggests that transfers 
should be implemented “through a system of tradable pollution permits which will 
equate the marginal abatement costs…” (p.8). When carrying out simulations for 20 
nations he finds that exploiting asymmetry under the aforementioned transfer 
scheme can reduce the free-rider incentive significantly as compared to the 
symmetric case. Barrett (2003) puts the asymmetry into the Ozone depletion 
context. He assumes that nations further away from the equator have more to gain 
from the treaty as they will suffer more due to lighter skin color, and depletion being 
more pronounced the further away a country is from the equator. His findings are 
similar in that asymmetry combined with side-payments substantially increases the 
number of signatories to an agreement compared to the non-cooperative symmetric 
situation. 
In the case of the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, 
developing countries are reimbursed the incremental cost of accession to the treaty. 
Incremental costs are those that occur once a party accedes to an agreement. For 
developing countries, acceding to the agreement then came at no cost. This 
mechanism was instrumental in increasing the number of participants. But there was 
also a cost to non-accession: trade sanctions. Non-acceding parties could suffer 
from trade sanctions as trade between parties and non-parties on 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) substances or goods including them should be restricted. 
The power of this “stick” is increasing in the number of parties to the agreements as 
this means larger restrictions. Trade-restriction in this case had the advantage that 
by not trading CFC containing substances, parties effectively shielded them from the 
problem of leakage (Barrett 2007). Relocating to a location that allowed CFC 
containing production was not profitable since with a high rate of participation there 
was no market to sell the products to. The cumulative impact of this “stick” and 
“carrot” was to increase cooperation significantly. The incremental cost clause was 
added to the agreement in 1990 and soon after important developing countries such 
as India and China joined the agreement (Barrett 2003).  
                                                                                                                                           
2 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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Technology transfer as side-payment mechanism in a new climate change 
agreement seems to have potential to increase cooperation, as it did in the Montreal 
protocol. But how should a transfer pattern look like? Where is green-technology 
actually developed? What institutions are essential in its development? These 
questions are addressed in the next section.  
2.3 On the development and distribution of green technology  
The development of advanced technology takes largely place in rich democratic 
countries (Acemoglu et al. 2006; Aghion et al. 2007). For example, about 70% of the 
technology that is currently transferred under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol comes from Japan, Germany, the USA, France, 
and Great Britain (Seres 2007). Certain factors that are common to most 
democracies seem to be instrumental for the development of these technologies. 
First, democracies are better at providing public goods such as good quality 
infrastructure and funding for public research which are vital ingredients to 
technological advancement (Mesquita et al., 2003; Aghion et al. 2007). Secondly, 
they provide a more competitive environment than autocratic states by keeping the 
cost of entry for companies which want to enter a sector at a lower level (Aghion et 
al. 2007). Finally, they provide a more secure legal environment which allows 
companies to appropriate the profits from their research (Mesquita et al., 2003).  
What are the driving factors that lead to a superior performance of 
democracies in the field of green-technology? Kuznets (1955) made the prediction 
that income inequality would increase in the early stages of economic development 
and then later decrease again, thus follow an inverted U-shape. In the beginning of 
the 1990’s when environmental data became more readily available a similar 
argument was made with respect to the quality of the environment. It was argued 
that in the early stages of economic development, environmental pollution tended to 
increase and in later stages this development would be reversed, thus following a 
similar pattern as the income -inequality development relationship (Grossman and 
Krueger 1991; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; Panayotou 1993). One of the 
basic arguments made as to why this phenomenon is observed is that in the early 
stages green technology is not available or is prohibitively expensive, thus 
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abatement does not take place. Another line of reasoning argues that in the early 
stages agriculture and resource intensive industry are the pre-dominant economic 
activities, whereas in later stages it is informational and services industries that 
dominate which are less natural resource intensive and produce less waste (Dinda 
2004). Furthermore, a common observed phenomenon when it comes to increasing 
material wealth is that people start to attach more value to things that go beyond the 
basics needs, such as environmental quality. Finally, countries with higher incomes 
tend to invest more into R&D which often leads to the replacement of dirty 
technologies with greener options (Komen et al. 1997). 
 There are four important qualifications to the basic arguments (Arrow et al. 
1995). First, the relationship holds mostly for pollutants that have local short-term 
costs but not for pollutants that involve long-term costs and dispersed effects. 
Second, the relationship seems only to hold for flow pollutants whereas stock 
pollutants do not seem to fit the pattern. Third, there might be a leakage effect in 
that the reduction of a pollutant in one country or sector can lead to the increase in 
another country or sector. This is essentially the leakage argument as discussed 
above. Finally, reduction in pollutants usually goes hand in hand with better 
environmental regulation that stems from institutional change. The argument is then 
that it is not first and foremost the increases in preference for environmental quality 
that is the driving factor behind the environmental Kuznets curve, but the ability of a 
society to translate these preferences into better environmental institutions that drive 
the development. As with respect to the effect of democracy on this phenomenon it 
is argued that “Institutional changes triggered by citizens’ demand for cleaner 
environments are more likely to occur in democratic countries” (Dinda 2004, p.444).  
Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that in stable democracies it is by far easier to 
win election with policies aimed towards the public, then by pleasing a small circle of 
cronies. In autocracies, a small circle might be enough to ensure the survival of the 
government, such as high ranking officials in vital military positions. But in 
democracies where power is less concentrated in the hands of a few the relevant 
electoral is not the small circle of cronies but a large part of the citizens. Bribing 
every citizen is then prohibitively expensive and it pays to embark on visible public 
policies. Polluting companies certainly benefit from not having to pay for the 
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externality they cause to the neighbourhood or to the global climate, at least in the 
short-term. The cost are then borne by the public and a regulator is needed to 
enforce the property rights of the public to a clean environment, dismissing the case 
of the company claiming that it has the right to pollute and citizens are to pay for not 
suffering from it. Such enforcement of property rights usually necessitates a 
functioning legal system and low levels of corruption. Mesquita et al. (2003) argue 
that an independent legal system is only in the interest of the government if the size 
of the electorate is large enough to switch its focus towards public policies. Also, the 
scientific expertise necessary to detect environmental pollution and create sufficient 
documentation to bring the case before courts necessitates expertise that is usually 
obtained at the tertiary level of education. Mesquita et al. (2003) present statistic 
evidence that it is the tertiary level of education that represents the gravest risk to 
autocratic regimes.  
Autocratic regimes are often characterized by high endemic levels of 
corruption. Besides raising the cost of doing business and making the judicial 
process less reliable, corruption requires a certain level of secrecy which means that 
the less people that are involved the better. This will reduce the number of firms 
active in a market and even more so the number of foreign firms entering (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993). Since they are often drivers of innovation, the secrecy necessary 
to carry out corruption is a further factor inhibiting innovation and the development of 
new technologies. In technologically advanced sectors, having superior technology 
is often the decisive competitive advantage (Aghion et al. 2007). By ensuring 
competition in these sectors, companies are then more likely to develop better 
technology in order to keep or acquire an advantage.  
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that a firm’s ability to appropriate research 
depends on its own R&D activity and that publicly available knowledge can increase 
a firm’s ability to do so. Additionally, the more complex technology becomes the 
more R&D activity is required to adopt it. Then if democracies ensure competition in 
an environment that has reached a high level of technology, firms will continue to 
invest in R&D in order to be able to adopt advances in technology.  
Another important issue in this context is spill-overs. As argued above, spill-
overs discourage investment into R&D as a company is not able to appropriate all of 
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the benefits of its R&D. But if R&D helps to catch the spill-over from other 
companies, then spill-overs might actually encourage R&D in order to be able to 
appropriate the research of others.  
Rich and democratic countries are the main developers of green-technology 
(Komen et al. 1997; Aghion et al. 2007). This is not likely to change soon as 
changes in political institutions as well as changes in wealth necessary to promote 
R&D for green-technology at a sufficient level often takes decades. In sum, the 
empirical phenomenon of the environmental Kuznets curve seems largely driven by 
institutional factors and does not hold for all pollutants, most importantly not the 
main pollutants driving human induced climate change. Nevertheless, countries with 
democratic institutions seem better equipped to master the problems related to this 
global problem as they can translate environmental preferences of their citizens 
better into effective policies than autocracies. As most of the increase in emissions 
will be coming from developing nations, technology transfer will be a vital 
component of any effort to avoid or mitigate drastic climate change. But since it is a 
vital component of any strategy that seeks to avoid or mitigate climate change and 
as most of the increase in emissions will come from developing countries, 
technology transfer will have to take place. What criteria can be applied in order to 
evaluate the success chances of technology transfer? What are the benefits besides 
the reduction in emissions? These questions are dealt with in the following section 
2.4 Success conditions for technology transfer and benefits 
The Green Revolution in agriculture that started in the 1930’s with research 
conducted by Norman Borlaug reaching Asia and Africa in the 60’s and 70’s, serves 
as an illustrative example concerning the success conditions for technology transfer. 
It was by far more successful in Asia than in Africa and a substantial part of the 
divergence in results can be attributed to the different educational levels in the two 
continents (Kapur and Crowley 2008). Local universities and research institutions 
played a decisive role in adopting the technologies to local circumstances: “Thus, in 
the absence of domestic skills, even global public goods (embodied in this case in 
the green revolution technologies) have very limited payoffs.” (Kapur and Crowley 
2008, p.13)  
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As argued above, tertiary education poses a significant threat to a regime. 
Therefore, a high level of tertiary education among the population is more likely to 
be observed in countries with democratic institutions. What drives this result? 
University education generates externalities for society at large that are hard to 
quantify (Kapur and Crowley 2008).For example, a stronger belief in freedom and 
universality. The presence of externalities would lead to an underprovision of tertiary 
education if no intervention by the state takes place. In addition, these values 
challenge the foundation of any oppressive regime which makes sub-optimal 
provision even more likely. A look at the current scale of public funding when it 
comes to tertiary education reveals that this problem has been recognized (OECD 
2007). 
 Another variable that plays an important role when it comes to the success 
of technology transfer is the level of corruption. Vishny and Shleifer (1993) argue 
that in countries with high levels of corruption there is an unusually high demand for 
technology that is too advanced given the technological level and skills present. 
However, it is much easier to collect bribes on too advanced expensive technology 
than on technology that can be supplied by several producers. Especially if aid 
money is used in the process which would require several potential suppliers biding 
for the contract, choosing a technology that is only supplied by one company and 
much more expensive is the more attractive option. Empirical studies have shown 
that corruption and other institutional variables are highly correlated with tertiary 
education and vice versa (Mesquita 2003, Kaufmann et al.2005). For example, low 
levels of corruption are often found in countries with a high level of education and a 
reliable rule of law. How exactly these variables influence each other and how the 
causality runs is still subject to research. However, this indicates that the before 
mentioned institutional variables can serve as indicators of the success chances of 
technology transfer. On a more general level, the International Environmental 
Technology Transfer Board established several criteria that can help to determine 
the success of technology transfer (MacDonald 1992). First of all, there should be 
local demand for the technology. Secondly, local entities must be informed about 
the availability of technology which requires a good informational network. Thirdly, a 
supporting infrastructure must be in place both in terms of capital and trained labour. 
Fourthly, the transfer must be economically viable in that it strengthens the local 
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economy. Fifthly, there must be sufficient financing, especially in the initial stages of 
the project. Finally, the technology must be appropriate to the context which can be 
facilitated by cooperation with local research institutions.  
 What are the potential benefits of technology transfer? Developing 
economies often experience increasing returns to scale in the initial stages of 
development (Murphy et al. 1989). In the model that Murphy et al. (1989) present, 
there are several industrial producers, none of which can produce profitably unless 
others use and pay for public infrastructure as well. Furthermore, one industrial 
producer creates demand for the others’ products by paying a wage above the 
agricultural wage level which allows for spending on more industrial goods. This is a 
variant of the Big-Push argument introduced first by Rostein-Roda (1943) that 
coordinated investment can help to jump-start industrialization when for each 
producer individually it is rational to not embark on this path.  
A relevant question is what kind of energy infrastructure will be erected to 
support the process of industrialization. To this day most developing countries and 
especially the larger ones such as China, India and Brazil have predominately 
based their energy infrastructure on fossil fuels (IEA 2008). This can partially be 
attributed to considerable subsidies for fossil fuels, missing development of green-
technology locally and missing information about the availability of such technology 
from developed countries (MacDonald 1992; Darmstadter 2002). Technology 
transfer can help to turn resolve the issue of missing information and locally missing 
development. Subsidies are however a political issue and face potentially the largest 
obstacle to a green-energy infrastructure. 
 In conclusion, technology transfer can have a substantial positive impact on 
the development of a poor country. But often in the past it has failed to achieve its 
full-potential due to lack of consideration of institutional factors that play an 
important role in determining its success and the lack of understanding of how to 
change these institutions over time.  
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2.5 Resource markets and green technology 
One of the most important results in the resource economics literature is the 
Hotelling rule (Hotelling 1931). It derives the optimal development of the price of a 
non-renewable resource over time depending on certain assumption. Assuming 
zero extraction costs, the price of a non-renewable resource should increase at the 
social rate of discount. This is the intertemporal efficiency condition for an efficient 
extraction path. One implication of this is that the discounted price of the natural 
resource is constant over time, which is a reformulation of the general asset-
efficiency condition. The Hotelling rule is then a necessary dynamic efficiency 
condition, but sufficiency is only achieved when one also considers the static 
efficiency requirements. Static efficiency in this context requires that whatever use a 
resource is put to, its marginal value should be equal to the marginal value of the 
resource stock in situ (Perman et al. 2003). In situ means resources left in the 
ground. Resource owners are then indifferent between extracting the resource in 
order to invest the proceeds and leaving the resource in the ground.  
There are four main complications that run counter to the assumptions made 
when deriving the Hotelling rule when confronting it with actual properties of non-
renewable resource stocks. Firstly, the total stock of a resource is usually not known 
with certainty (Perman et al. 2003). Secondly, over time there will be new 
discoveries. Thirdly, there is a difference between the total stock available and that 
which is economically viable to extract. Finally, R&D can change extraction costs, 
replace the non-renewable resource by a renewable one and can give a clearer 
image of the damages expected from extraction.  
The Hotelling rule is of significant relevance concerning the issue of human 
induced climate change since the emissions causing it come from non-renewable 
resources. By considering the Hotelling rule and the four mentioned complications 
one can arrive at an extraction pattern which corresponds to different emission 
scenarios. Since we are considering a stock problem, the goal should be to flatten 
the extraction path of non-renewable resources that emit greenhouse relevant 
gases and thereby lowering the amount of emissions at every point in time (Sinn 
2007). Sinn considers several policy measures that are available to achieve this 
outcome. By announcing a decrease in the ad-valorem tax today, governments 
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would provide producers with an incentive to extract at a later point in time. The 
problem of this policy lies in fact that governments would have to commit to reducing 
taxes in the future, which is problematic at best. A second measure is a constant 
unit tax on carbon extraction. In order to be effective it should be constant over time 
and it should be applied uniformly world wide in order to avoid leakage effects. 
Another solution would be to subsidize the in situ stock, in effect paying resource 
owners to not extract. The political infeasibility of paying quasi-regimes that already 
derive large resource rents renders this option unfeasible. Taxing capital income 
would slow down the rate of extraction as investment of resource derived income 
becomes less attractive. This could however lead to a sub-optimal accumulation of 
capital in the world economy. A more viable step would be to close tax havens in 
order to ensure equal taxation of resource owners.  
Sinn also makes the argument that if resource owners feel unsafe about their 
property rights, they will increase the speed of extraction as they cannot be sure that 
they will be able to derive income from the resource in the future. Finally, binding 
emission constraints reduce the price of the resource because they lower the 
demand for emission related products by increasing the price of the final product. By 
setting an upper limit to allowed emissions and by sufficiently broad participation a 
ceiling would be established that ensures that critical limits will not be reached. 
Since the Kyoto protocol currently only restraints a minority of worldwide emissions 
a more inclusive climate change agreement is necessary to render this strategy 
effective. Without broad participation lower prices for fossil fuels in one region will 
increase the demand for them in others, the leakage effect.  
What is the impact of better green-technology development and dispersion? 
Abatement costs will be lowered and the incentives to switch from fossil to 
renewable fuels will increase. The effects are illustrated in the following figure 
adopted from Perman et al. (2003)  
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Figure 1: Effect of a fall in the price of a renewable energy technology on the 
consumption of a non-renewable energy source 
 
Source: Perman et al. 2003 
More R&D and better dispersion of green-technology are likely to reduce the 
cost of abatement and encourage the usage of clean fuels as compared to fossil 
fuels as their price decreases, the backstop price in the figure. With a lower 
backstop price PB , given the demand curve D, the resource owner can only charge 
PB at the end of the extraction period since above this price all consumers will 
switch to the backstop technology. Two important assumptions underlying this figure 
are that all of the resource will be extracted and that the backstop technology is 
available in amounts that can satisfy any level of demand for it. The curvature of the 
curve that describes the development of the net price over time is determined by the 
social discount rate, following Hotelling’s rule. The fall in the backstop price does not 
change the social discount rate. Therefore, the curvature or increase over time does 
not change. Given the same increase of price over time, the initial price P0 has to 
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drop to P’0 , in order to reach PB at a point when all of the resource is extracted. The 
lower price of the non-renewable resource at all points in time as compared to 
before encourages more consumption. As the total stock of the resource has not 
changed, this implies that the resource will be extracted at an earlier point in time. 
The extraction schedule is described in the quadrant R/T, where R stand for the 
amount extracted at a certain point in time.  
A consequence of this result when we consider fossil fuels is more 
greenhouse gas emission in a shorter period of time. But demand for fossil fuels in 
general will decline due to the lower price of renewable options. Depending which of 
these effects dominates the time to total extraction of the non-renewable resource 
may eventually be longer or shorter (Hoel 2008). Without an international agreement 
in place that puts a ceiling on the maximum amount emissions, better technology 
policy by itself is unlikely to help avoiding drastic climate change (Sinn 2007; Hoel 
2008). 
Combating human induced climate change in order to avoid excessive 
economic costs will necessitate a substantial increase in technology transfer 
compared to the level we observe at the moment due to the expected increase in 
emissions from developing countries and the pattern of development of green 
technology. This transfer will have to be part of an international agreement that also 
includes emission limits, most likely for developing and developed countries. Such 
an agreement should include as many countries as possible in order to strengthen 
the overall effectiveness in terms of avoidance of excessive costs. The next two 
chapters will analyze the two currently most important international treaties on 
international climate change, showing their shortcomings and potential for 
synergies, based on the pre-ceding discussion.      
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3.  The Kyoto Protocol 
3.1 Introduction 
Adopted on December 11th 1997, the Kyoto protocol is an international 
environmental agreement that seeks to limit global greenhouse gas emissions in the 
face of human induced climate change. It came into force on the 16th February 2005 
when at least 55 parties covering 55% of the industrialized countries’ green house 
gas emission of 1990 had ratified, accepted, approved and acceded to it. Whereas 
countries member to the convention are only encouraged to reduce their emission, 
the protocol commits them to do so. The first phase of emission reductions is 
scheduled to run for 5 years from 2008 to 2012. In this phase the overall goal is to 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions of industrialized countries, or Annex I 
countries, by 5.2%. As historical emission levels are quite diverse, different 
reduction obligations have been assigned to countries. For example, whereas the 
EU is expected to reduce its emissions by 8% and Japan by 6%, Russia is allowed 
to stay emit at his 1990 level. Developing or Annex II countries are exempted from 
emission reduction. This exemption is embedded in the protocol under the “common 
but differentiated approach” which takes into account historical emission patters. 
Under this approach, the burden of financing the mitigation and adaptation falls on 
the industrialized countries. As of January 2009 the Kyoto Protocol covers 63.7% of 
industrialized countries’ emission in 19903. 
In order to lower the cost of compliance to the protocol in absence of 
developing countries which would provide a large amount of emission permits, two 
flexible mechanisms are part of the protocol. The first is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), where agents from industrialized countries can engage in 
projects in developing countries that help to reduce emission, thereby gaining 
emission credits at a lower cost than in their domestic market. An important 
requirement for a CDM project to be approved is the “additionality” requirement in 
                                              
3 http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification.pdf 
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that it reduces emissions of the project over what would have occurred without the 
CDM. The second flexible mechanism is the Joint Implementation mechanism (JI). 
Projects under this mechanism have to fulfill similar requirements as the CDM. 
Whereas CDM projects can be carried out between Annex I and Annex II parties, 
countries with emission restrictions and without emission restrictions, JI can only be 
carried out between Annex I countries.  
3.2 Analysis 
The protocol in its current form does not have a favorable cost-benefit ratio for 
Annex I countries when contrasting the costs that they have to incur in order to fulfill 
their abatement obligations, in comparison to the probable benefits they derive from 
damages avoided in the future. Whereas this cost-benefit ratio was 1:11 for the 
Montreal Protocol for the participating industrialized countries, this ratio stands at 
1:0.5 for the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I parties (Barrett 2007). These numbers rely 
on results from estimations carried out by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). They 
recently revised their numbers and the ratio now stands at 1:1.7 (Nordhaus 2008). 
Even though this renders overall action profitable, it does so only marginally 
compared to the Montreal Protocol. An aspect that made the Montreal protocol so 
effective was that all its parties profited considerably from it (Barrett 2003). One 
important factor that makes the Kyoto Protocol so expensive for Annex I countries is 
that developing countries have no abatement obligations and are therefore not 
participating in the emission market. Abatement in developing countries is generally 
cheaper than in developed countries (Ellerman et al. 1998; Nordhaus and Boyer 
1998). If these countries were bound by emission limits and offered their permits on 
the international permit market it would be considerably cheaper for actors in 
developed countries to abate. Nordhaus and Boyer (1998), using the RICE-98 
model in order to determine the costs of the protocol, find that the US would have to 
pay two thirds of the total cost of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. They 
also find that without the inclusion of developing countries and effective 
enforcement, the cost of permit per ton of CO2 is likely to rise over 250$ throughout 
this century. Finally, the further mitigation and adaptation measures are postponed 
in the future the more will cost increase, likely so at an increasing rate (Stern 2007).   
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 As mentioned above, the world does not only suffer a global externality from 
climate changing emissions but also a lack of environmental related R&D that deals 
with climate change relevant emissions. That externality is not sufficiently addressed 
in the Kyoto protocol. There is no mechanism that would allow countries to take into 
account the global effect that their environmental related R&D has which will lead to 
an underprovision (Hoel 2005). Countries will only consider the reduction in 
abatement costs that their R&D has at home if there is an international agreement 
regulating emissions without R&D provisions. If there is no international agreement 
regulating emissions they will consider the benefit that environmental R&D, has on 
indicators such as companies’ profits or on locally relevant pollutants within national 
jurisdiction. The optimal provision of knowledge at home is already negatively 
influenced by the knowledge externality discussed above. The effect of R&D is a 
reduction in marginal abatement cost. As long as this is only set equal to the 
countries’ marginal abatement cost whereas a new technology has a truly global 
potential, the effort exerted will be sub-optimal. Even if the permit trade that takes 
place under the Kyoto Protocol equalizes marginal abatement costs in participating 
regions and induces more environmental R&D as a market “pull” effect (Jaffe et al. 
2005; Lawrence 2007), the level is still likely to be insufficient:”… there will be too 
little R&D expenditure in the Kyoto type agreement even if total emissions are set 
equal to what they are in the first-best optimum” (Hoel 2005, p.59). Furthermore, the 
permit trade does not have any provisions in itself addressing the issue of 
technology transfer between Annex I and Annex II parties. Technology transfer may 
take place through technological spill-overs, but most likely at levels that are 
insufficient.  
The only way in which technology transfer is somehow addressed in the 
protocol is via its two other mechanisms, the CDM and JI. Yet technology transfer is 
not a necessary condition for projects under these mechanisms to take place. The 
mechanism has only been operating fairly recently. A study by Seres (2007) finds 
that about 39% of CDM projects claim to involve technology transfer. What exactly 
is meant by technology transfer is not specified under CDM regulations. These 
projects are responsible for 64% of all emission reductions achieved under CDM, 
which points to the fact that it is often large projects that involve technology transfer. 
About 56% of projects that involve technology transfer claim to transfer equipment 
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and knowledge, 32% involve only knowledge. Projects with knowledge transfer 
alone account for about 11% of all technology transfer projects.  
Even if technology transfer is involved, the mechanisms themselves suffer 
from several inefficiencies that make them unsuitable for achieving a reduction in 
abatement costs that does not change the global amount of emission permits. As 
long as there are no emission limits in place in developing countries, CDM projects 
lowering the demand for fossil fuels in one sector of the economy can cause an 
increase of demand in another, the leakage effect mentioned before (Hagem 
2009).The mechanisms also increase the incentive to reduce the profitability of 
projects artificially. Projects under CDM and JI are only carried out if they fulfill the 
additionality criterion, which requires that they would not have been carried out 
without the investment via one of the two mechanisms. This can lead to too many 
projects being actually carried out which may in turn then increase total emissions 
(Wara 2008; Hagem and Holtsmark 2009) Investors receive emission credits for the 
estimated avoided emissions. By increasing the estimated emissions of a project, 
developing country entrepreneurs can increase the profitability of the projects for 
foreign investors which will then receive too many emission permits with respect to 
actually avoided emissions. With human induced climate change being a stock 
pollution problem, the overall impact of CDM and JI is inconclusive at best. A 
possible fix to these problems would be better enforcement. But enforcement comes 
at the price of higher transaction costs and many worthwhile projects especially at a 
smaller scale are then unlikely to be carried out (Hagem 2009). 
 Estimates regarding how much developing countries will need in order to 
finance mitigation and adaptation efforts vary between 10-100 billion US$ per year: 
World Bank US$10-40 billion, UNFCCC US$ 28-67 billion, UNDP US$ 86 billion, 
Oxfam International US$ 50 billion, Christian Aid US$ 100 billion (Hægstand and 
Skjærseth 2009).  
The large variation in the estimated cost is due to the uncertainties inherent in 
such a theme as climate change, which makes adequate predictions of where the 
damages will take place difficult. Under the Kyoto Protocol the Adaption Fund (AF) 
has been established which derives money from a 2% charge on all CDM projects. 
At the time of writing the fund has just become operational and no projects have 
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been supported yet (Hægstand and Skjærseth 2009). Financing from other 
international funds focused on the issue amount to 133.4 million US$ represents a 
substantial gap from what is needed. World Bank and UNDP estimates indicate that 
the financial basis of the AF can grow rapidly over the next years and might even 
reach US$ 950 million by 2012. But those figures depend on the continued and 
better functioning of the CDM mechanism. What a post-Kyoto agreement will look 
like can only be guessed at this time. Considering the drawbacks of CDM and JI 
described above the question if the fund will survive in this form the next round of 
negotiations should be asked.  
Most of the funds described in the previous section represent public finance 
efforts to deal with the problem of poor-country adaptation. In the area of 
technological development and diffusion it is the private sector that is of utmost 
importance and as long as there are not sufficient incentives in place to get it 
sufficiently engaged it is unlikely that enough funds will be provided by public 
sources (Lawrence 2007). Also, with much of the funding for new technologies 
coming from public funds there is always the risk of lobbying, or winners picking 
themselves.  
Another incentive issue concerning technological development when it comes 
to the Kyoto protocol is its relatively short time horizon when considering the scale 
of the problem and uncertainties with regard to the outcome of the following 
negotiations. If private investors are to commit to substantial investments they need 
a longer time horizon (Wagner 2001). Strategic underinvestment might actually be 
an outcome of this. Countries could claim to have excessive abatement costs, 
therefore being in need of large amounts of permits or little abatement requirements 
imposed on them. Those high costs could be achieved by under-investment into 
environmental R&D (Wagner 2001). Finally, as already noted above the Kyoto 
Protocol has the characteristic of a consensus protocol. The emission cuts are not 
substantial enough to really put a dent to the climate change issue since developing 
countries are not subject to emission limits, the cooperative outcome, but they are 
set at a level that was able to include as many parties as possible resulting in 
collective free-riding. (Wagner 2001). 
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3.3 Conclusion 
The Kyoto protocol represents the first serious global effort to curb greenhouse 
gases in order to avoid drastic climate change. As such it was likely that several 
short-comings would be discovered in its design and there were in fact several 
significant ones. Firstly, while taking into account the negative externality of 
greenhouse gases and addressing this via binding emission limits, it fails to take into 
account the knowledge and adaptation externalities. Too little research R&D in 
green technology is carried out on a global scale since countries and entrepreneurs 
do not have incentives for taking into account the global effects of their efforts. 
Secondly, the mechanisms that are addressing these issues, the CDM and JI, suffer 
from bad incentives and it is questionable if they will still exist in their current form 
when the time comes to instate a new agreement. Yet one of the funds that is 
supposed to increase investment into mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries, the AF, relies on funding from CDM. This is far from optimal when 
considering the long-term nature that is inherent to many of these investments. 
Thirdly, since only industrialized countries are subject to emission limits the cost-
benefit ratio is unfavorable. It is largely accepted that developed countries are likely 
to finance most of the adaptation measures necessary in developing countries. 
Developing countries will be responsible for most of the increase in emissions in the 
future (IEA 2008). Coupled with the leakage issue it will be necessary to impose 
some sort of emission limits on developing countries as otherwise efforts by 
industrialized countries are unlikely to have any effect (Stern 2007). Also, without 
such limits in place Annex II countries will have insufficient incentives to adopt green 
technology. It is important to realize these short-comings since the mechanisms 
employed in the Kyoto Protocol are likely to exert a strong influence on future 
climate change agreements.  
 
 
 27
4. The Asian-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate 
4.1 Introduction 
First announced at the 38th ASEAN Ministerial in Vientiane, Laos in 2005 the Asian-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) was officially 
launched in July 2006. One of the purposes of the partnership is to, “Create a 
voluntary, non-legally binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate the 
development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and longer 
term cost- effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices among the 
Partners through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical 
results.”4 Eight public-private task forces have been created in order to achieve this 
purpose in different sectors. These are: Aluminum, building and appliances, cement, 
cleaner fossil energy, coal mining, power generation and transmission, renewable 
energy and distributed generation and finally steel. Currently the US, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea, India and China are members to the APP. Together, 
they account for more than 50% of global climate change relevant emissions.  
4.2 Analysis 
What can an agreement like the APP achieve theoretically? And what has it 
achieved until now? As mentioned above, pure technology agreements are unlikely 
to achieve much when it comes to emission reductions due to the impact that new 
technologies have on resource markets. A lower choke price for non-renewable 
resources might actually speed up extraction (Perman 2003; Hoel 2008). Without 
binding emission limits that are enforced, this may lead to more climate change 
relevant emission over a shorter period of time which will result in worsening the 
climate change problem as argued above. Even if the lower price of green 
                                              
4 http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/about.aspx 
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technology leads to a replacement of fossil fuels and actually lower emissions in that 
country, the global effect may still not be positive. This is due to the leakage effect 
that will encourage consumption of fossil fuels since reduction of demand in 
countries regulated by emission caps or taxes will depress the global price.  
This effect is similar to the problem described above concerning the CDM 
since developing countries are not subject to any emission limits. Two important 
sectors that are globally responsible for a large part of emission have no task force 
assigned to them in the APP. The two sectors are agriculture and transportation, 
responsible for 13.5% and 13.1% respectively of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
(IPCC, 2007c). With improvements occurring in the other sectors, those sectors are 
likely to benefit from lower energy prices. Even though some of the members are 
also part to the Kyoto Protocol and subject to binding emission limits, Japan, 
Australia and Canada all of them are currently far away from fulfilling their emission 
reduction obligations it is unlikely that they will achieve them before 20125. 
Spending public money on R&D also comes with a series of problems. 
Governments are in general not good at picking winners, markets often do better 
(Jaffe et al. 2005). Public spending gives politicians the opportunity to claim that 
spending and use it as an argument when elections come up. Slashing taxes or 
quantity restriction on industry is less likely to be used as an argument for re-
election even though it offers the better long-term solution (Jaffe et al. 2005). 
However, there are certain situations under which the argument for government 
intervention in this field can be advanced. As the global climate is a global good, 
public spending on technological improvements can be justified on similar grounds 
as spending on national defense. Secondly, as some major players are still not 
governed by environmental policy such as emission caps that is by many 
considered the most effective way to encourage development of new technology, 
public spending in this area can fill part of the gap (Jaffe et al. 2005).  
In order to stimulate adaptation of new green technologies, two kinds of 
incentives are required. A “push” incentive that can come in the form of research, 
                                              
5 http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/ghg_fact_sheet.pdf 
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better information or subsidies and a “pull” incentive that can come from increasing 
taxes on the undesirable economic good, fossil fuels in this case (Lawrence 2007). 
The APP scores only well on the push side of the issue, whereas the pull issue is 
markedly absent. As the agreement is voluntary in nature, there is no real incentive 
for countries to adopt costly technologies, especially if they are aware of the leakage 
issue. Public information might not be able to reach all relevant companies that 
might actually have an incentive to adopt a technology. However, higher prices 
eventually reach all those companies.  
What about the financial base of the APP? The US has promised US$ 50 
million for its first year of operation (Lawrence 2007). Australia has promised US$ 
150 million over the next 5 years (Lawrence 2007). Compared to the actual need for 
investment of US$ 10-100 billion annually this sum seems meager (Skjaerseth 
2009). Even more so when considering that the members of the APP are 
responsible for more than 50% of global emissions. In the Montreal protocol 
developed countries had an obligation via a certain formula to pay for the 
incremental cost of developing countries for acceding to the agreement. In the case 
of the APP this is voluntary and the outcome seems to be disappointing.   
4.3 Conclusion 
Members to the APP agree that “The Partnership will be consistent with and 
contribute to Partners’ efforts under the UNFCCC and will complement, but not 
replace, the Kyoto Protocol.”6 Most of the member countries that are also bound by 
the Kyoto protocol are currently failing their emission reduction obligations7. 
Furthermore, the economics of APP suggest that its complementarity with the Kyoto 
protocol is ambiguous at best.  
To date the APP has largely relied on public finance measures. It has the 
potential to bring the private sector into the picture as it has adopted a sectoral 
                                              
6 http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/about.aspx 
7 http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/ghg_fact_sheet.pdf 
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approach that specifically wants to spread best-practice examples from the different 
sectors. But so far it has achieved little in this respect which could have been a 
major positive distinction in comparison to the Kyoto Protocol (Lawrence 2007). The 
voluntary nature of funding has not led to levels of funding that are in line with what 
is needed, as could be expected. But most importantly, the APP neglects the power 
of the “pull” incentive. This could come from a system of binding emission limits and 
trading and is likely to be far more effective than the policy of picking winners as it 
seems to be practiced at the moment. There is room for public spending in the field 
of environmental R&D, but this is generally more effective at the basic research 
level and not when bringing products to the market.  
The APP can certainly help to bring information about new technologies to 
the market, which is an important part in any technological diffusion policy. But as 
long as APP members are not willing to act upon the negligence described, the 
partnership cannot be regarded as viable option for combating human-induced 
climate change and is unlikely to be an effective complement to the Kyoto protocol. 
Taking into account some of the failures described in the last two chapters 
concerning technology transfer as well as the theoretical background in chapter one, 
a largely self-conceived technology transfer mechanism will now be introduced in 
the next chapter.  
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5. Green Technology Banks 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding section showed that the currently two most important international 
agreements trying to address the issue of human induced climate change lack 
several relevant dimensions in order to be effective. The Kyoto Protocol, while 
limiting emissions in industrialized countries, fails to take into account the problem of 
insufficient R&D in green technology and addresses technology transfer only 
superficially. Furthermore, developing countries do presently not face emission 
limits, which led to an increase of the compliance cost for developed countries as 
they could not take advantage of the lower abatement cost in developing countries 
via emission permit trade. Without developing country participation in a climate 
change agreement, developed countries had an incentive not to agree on 
substantial emission cuts then, due to the associated costs. 
An important actor concerning the provision and dispersion of green-
technology is the private sector. On a global scale they have little incentive to 
increase their efforts in environmental R&D and to take into account the effect that 
this could have in developing countries. Also, without the willingness of developing 
countries to accept binding emission limits the efforts of developed countries are 
unlikely to have a significant effect due to the issue of leakage.  
The APP is a purely technology-orientated partnership based on voluntary 
participation and contributions. In its founding statement the claim is made that it 
complements the Kyoto Protocol. As argued above, it is unlikely to do so. First of all, 
it is likely to lead to increases in emissions due to the working of resource markets. 
Secondly, its funding so far is meager as can be expected from a voluntary 
agreement that tries to address a problem riddled with externality issues. Thirdly, 
without a technological “pull” incentive for India and China, by for example binding 
emissions limits, adoption of green technology will be limited.  
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A conceivable first-best solution to the problem of the sub-optimal provision 
of R&D could be to stipulate commitments in a new climate change agreement. 
Monitoring R&D expenditures of other countries and developing global guidelines to 
do so involve substantial transaction costs. Hoel (2005) notes “Policies aimed at 
influencing R&D investments by private firms will be an integrated part of a country’s 
tax system and to some extent other domestic policies. As tax systems and other 
policies vary significantly across countries, it will in practice hardly be feasible for a 
country (or some international agency) to verify all aspects of R&D policies of other 
countries” (p.53).    
5.2  GTB 
5.2.1 The Basic Idea 
In order to address some of the previously mentioned shortcomings I will now 
introduce the concept Green Technology Banks (GTB). It is based on the idea 
advanced by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001;2007) that a more technology-
centred approach is necessary to address the issue of human induced climate 
change. The operational details are however quite different. The overriding goal of 
the proposal is to develop an incentive compatible mechanism to transfer green-
technology to developing countries. This transfer, intended as a side-payment in a 
new agreement, might be one aspect that can help to increase cooperation in a new 
climate change agreement that includes emission limits for all countries. To analyse 
its potential to do so, game theoretical tools will be used in chapter six. As this 
proposal is largely self-conceived and given the time limitations of a Master’s thesis, 
the proposal should be seen as a first step that will not be able to address all 
concerns in the pages ahead. The goal of this section is then to offer an introduction 
to the economic mechanisms that should induce developed and developing 
countries to participate.  
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5.2.2 Assumptions 
Several assumptions are vital for the GTB to be workable. First of all, the 
assumption is made that technology is a private good that has a range of positive 
externalities as discussed in the theory and background chapter. Technology here is 
first and foremost considered to be a technical apparatus. The soft-skills that come 
with it, such as better technical knowledge, fall under the category of externalities. 
Secondly, it is assumed that in the foreseeable future there will be no global permit 
market but rather several regional permit markets that are imperfectly linked. 
Furthermore, these regional permit markets will not be perfect in the sense that not 
all sectors of the economy will be regulated by emission caps or taxes, especially in 
developing countries. One implication of this is different abatement cost levels in 
different regions of the world. Finally, as the GTB is to operate under a climate 
change agreement that imposes emission limits on developed as well as developing 
countries, any permit transfers that takes place will be a zero sum game in terms of 
global total emissions. If a transfer takes place, one country will have to give up 
emission permits in order for the transacting partner to acquire them.  
5.2.3 Informational basis and governance 
Three major obstacles hinder the spreading of already existing green-technology 
and environmental R&D at sufficient levels taking into account its global effects. 
First of all, it is largely produced by private companies in developed countries and it 
is protected by patents that make it often unaffordable for governments and 
entrepreneurs in developing countries. Secondly, developed for condition prevalent 
in developed countries, it cannot easily be used in developing countries. In addition 
to this developing countries often do not have the capacity to adapt the technology 
to local circumstances. Finally, there is no common and easily accessible database 
or information source that gives a concise overview about the developments in the 
field of green-technology and environmental R&D: “Technology infrastructure such 
as data collection and dissemination, and training of scientists and engineers is 
likely to be seriously underprovided by market incentives alone.” (Jaffe et al. 2005, 
p.173). This lack of information combined with the two previous hindrances results 
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in a less than optimal adoption of green-technology with respect to better known 
polluting technologies.  
Under the GTB, developed countries are to establish a database with 
information about green-technologies available from the public and the private 
sector in developed and developing countries. Information about the availability of 
green-technology would become accessible essentially for free but the actual 
construction plans would still be protected by patents. The database would be a 
sales catalogue and users would still have to pay for acquiring the actual 
technology. The goal of the database is to create a common platform that is widely 
known and accepted in order to provide up-to-date technological information in the 
field of green-technologies to reduce the search costs for the private and public 
sector in both developed and developing countries. Developed countries should 
bear the financial responsibility for setting up the operation. Public and private 
research institutes as well as firms and governments from both developing and 
developed countries can contribute to the database. As argued above, most of the 
green-technology is developed in the private sector of rich democratic countries. 
Most of the input to the database will come from there but it can be expected that 
technology from developing countries will play an increasingly important role over 
time.  
As this will be an international body both developed and developing countries 
should be part of the governance structure with influence not attached to financial 
commitments but rather as equals. Experts from developing and developed 
countries should be responsible for keeping the database up to date and 
approaching both the public and the private sector for contributions. Developing 
country expertise will be crucial to identify technology that has the potential to be 
successfully transferred to developing countries or that has the potential to be 
adopted to local conditions (MacDonald 1992).  
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5.2.4 The incentive mechanism to focus more on green-technology 
R&D 
Under the GTB, developed country firms would receive extra emission permits if a 
transfer of technology takes place. How many emission credits are transferred 
depends on the evaluation of the amount of emissions that have been avoided 
compared to the Business-As-Usual case (BAU). An exact determination of how 
many emissions were avoided could be carried out by similar institutions as the 
ones that are currently responsible for this task under the CDM. The emission 
permits could be sold in the regional market where the developed country company 
operates or be used to lower the required abatement effort. The opportunity to sell 
emission credits in the regional permit market is crucial as it allows developed 
country companies that are not regulated by emission caps to gain from increasing 
R&D into green-technology. Both types of companies receive then effectively a 
subsidy for technology transfer. The overall goal of this in-kind reward is to increase 
R&D in green-technology that is also applicable in developing countries.   
The developed country government would buy emission credits from the 
government of the company that receives the technology. The former then transfers 
these emission credits to the developed country company involved in the project. 
The developing country government either buys the emission rights from the 
participating company if it is subject to emission caps, or buys them in the regional 
emission market if a company is not subject to emission caps. Companies in 
developing countries subject to tradable emission caps do not receive a direct 
subsidy but can now obtain technology at a lower price than before. This is due to 
the standard tax/subsidy incidence as shown in the figure below adopted from 
Schotter (2001): 
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Figure 5.1: Effect of a subsidy for developed country firms on the price and 
quantity of green-technology 
                   
Source: Schotter 2001 
 
The initial market price, P0, is defined by the intersection of the curves labelled D 
and S1 .The subsidy to the developed country firm shifts the supply curve of 
technology down to the right. This increases the quantity of technology supplied, 
from Q1 to Q2, and decreases the price consumers of technology have to pay, in 
this case developing country firms. As in the standard analysis, how much of the 
subsidy accrues to consumers and how much to suppliers depends on the elasticity 
of the two curves. In the figure above, the area from Ct to P0 below the demand 
curve accrues to the consumer, developing country firms. The area P0-Pt above the 
supply curve S2 accrues to developed country firms supplying the technology. Due 
to the permit transfer the price of permits in the regional market in developing 
countries will increase, since supply is reduced. However, the assumption is made 
here that the level of the price increase will not be substantial enough to offset the 
benefit of a decreased price of green-technology. 
Companies in developing countries that are not subject to emission caps 
receive an actual subsidy besides the decrease in the price of technology.  The 
money paid by the developed country government for the emission credits obtained 
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by the developing country government will be transferred to them. Since non-
regulated companies do not have the same “pull” incentive (Lawrence 2007) to 
adopt green-technology as their regulated peers, an additional incentive to do so is 
important.   
Under this transfer scheme the global amount of emissions does not change. 
The two figures below illustrate the working of the mechanism for companies that 
are regulated by emission caps and companies that are not regulated by emission 
caps. 
 
Figure 5.2: Technology Transfer among companies subject to emission 
caps 
 
Source: Self-conceived 
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Figure 5.3: Technology Transfer among companies not subject to emission 
caps 
 
Source: Self-conceived 
The assumption is made here that if regional permit markets were 
established in developing countries, the market price of permits would be 
substantially lower than in a developed country market.. This is based on the 
assessment of various studies that abatement costs are lower in developing 
countries (Ellerman et al. 1998; Nordhaus and Boyer 1998; Barrett 2007). The 
technology-transfer mechanism would then lead to more equal marginal abatement 
costs in the two regions.  
The eligibility of firms in developing countries to receive a technology-transfer 
subsidy should be based on the chances of success for advanced technology in that 
country. Such success criteria could for example be based on the level of 
corruption, higher education, rule of law and similar institutional indicators as argued 
above 
Finally, a regular evaluation should take place if the emission credit transfer 
alone is enough to induce sufficient R&D in green-technology. If this is not the case, 
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then the developed country government should evaluate to provide subsidies in 
addition to emission credits. 
5.2.5 Access to the database and incentives for developing country 
actors 
The information provided in the database can be accessed by firms, research 
institutions and governments from both developed and developing countries for free. 
These actors can use the information to identify technologies that are suitable for 
projects they are about to undertake. If entrepreneurs of developing countries who 
are members to a new climate change agreement have identified a technology that 
they would like to use, they and the providing company from the developed country 
engage in the transfer described in the previous section. Mostly developed countries 
will be responsible for financing the transfer mechanism based on the pattern of 
green-technology development discussed in chapter two.  
The transfer scheme does not extend to technology outside the GTB 
database. Green technologies under the GTB are evaluated by experts for their 
potential effectiveness and stand for a certain quality which cannot be assured for 
technologies outside the agreement. Actors in non-participating countries to the new 
climate change agreement will still have access to the database, but will not receive 
subsidies for technologies acquired via the GTB. Entrepreneurs in developing 
countries should therefore have an interest in pressuring their respective 
government to join the agreement in order to gain access to green-technology via 
GTB, as it reduces their cost of operation and offers them technology that might 
otherwise be hard to come by. An important consideration in this context pertains to 
secondary benefits derived from technology transfer. Some of them, such as higher 
economic growth and more reliable energy infrastructure, were laid out in chapter 
two. Additional benefits are usually the reduction of other pollutants with a local 
impact (Ekin 1996), better health (Künzli 2001), and increased technical skill of 
employees. These secondary benefits represent then an additional incentive for 
developing countries and firms to participate in the GTB. The relative costliness of 
abstention for developing countries in terms of potential access to subsidized green-
technology should increase the more developed countries are part to a new treaty 
 40 
as the likelihood increases that developing country actors could find a feasible 
technology for their projects without having to incur higher costs. 
5.2.6 Incentives for developed country actors to join and provide R&D 
In order to increase the involvement of the private sector in developed countries in 
green technology R&D and dispersion private firms receive subsidies in form of 
emission credits from their governments for technology transferred under the GTB. 
These can then be sold on the regional permit market or used to reduce obligatory 
abatement effort.  This represents a “push” and “pull” incentive (Jaffe et al. 2005) for 
private firms and research institutions in developed countries to take into account 
the effect that their technology can have in developing countries. Firms from 
developed countries can comply with emission limits imposed on them at a lower 
cost.  The abatement that they undertake in developing countries via their 
technology transfer is likely to be cheaper than it would have been at home. If they 
are not subject to emission caps, they can sell the emission permits in the 
marketplace. An extensive analysis if these incentives are sufficient is not part of 
this thesis but would be a valuable extension if data is available.  
The setup of the GTB is similar to the one that drives the CDM and 
transactions occurring under this mechanism are rapidly increasing. But any 
mechanism that has the goal of transferring technology from developed and 
developing countries and aims to be incentive compatible will run into these costs 
Once again, a definitive analysis of the transaction costs of the CDM and GTB 
mechanism are not part of this thesis but would be valuable extensions.  
An additional incentive is dependent on the level of usage and popularity of 
the GTB. The more known the GTB is in developing countries, the more beneficial 
will participating in it be as developing and developed country entrepreneurs will use 
it as a standard tool to find technologies that are necessary for their projects. This 
has the potential to reduce marketing costs for developed country firms.  
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5.2.7 Technical assistance 
In addition to financial assistance, technical assistance will be needed as well in 
order to train personnel to maintain the technology and to further its distribution in 
the economy from a local basis. This can be part of the GTB transfer if the company 
providing the technology also has experts available that can help to implement 
technology locally. Otherwise, auctions should be held to find the best offer for 
technical assistance. Many development agencies around the world have technical 
departments that would be well equipped to cater to this need.  
5.2.8 Green-Technology and Non-Members to a new climate change 
agreement 
Should countries part to a new climate change agreement actively hamper the 
access to green-technology to non-participants? Trying to block usage of green 
technology by countries not part to a new climate change agreement is potentially 
harmful to them. Golombek and Hoel (2005) investigate a situation where there is a 
“clean” country that is concerned with the environment and performs R&D and a 
“dirty” country that is little concerned with the environment and performs no R&D. 
There is no agreement concerning limiting emissions between the two actors. 
Technological spillovers occur in a linear fashion. It is shown that if abatement is 
increased in the clean country via more R&D that lowers abatement costs, 
technological spillovers lead to more abatement in the dirty country as well if the 
damage function is linear, otherwise the effect is not clear. One could argue that it is 
important to have a threat in place in order to encourage countries to join a new 
climate change agreement. But since it would be beneficial for the developer of a 
technology to allow for spillovers to take place freely given that technology is 
already developed, it is unlikely that this will be a useful tool.  
5.2.9 GTB in comparison to CDM 
The GTB mechanism is in some respects similar to the CDM mechanism in place 
now. It offers governments or firms from developed countries an opportunity to 
achieve abatement at a lower cost in developing countries. Emission reductions 
must be certified which implies similar transactions cost issues as for the CDM. Yet 
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any mechanism that wants to promote transfers of this kind will be subject to these 
issues.  
As mentioned before, a definite comparison of transaction costs between 
CDM and GTB is not part of this thesis. However, compared to CDM the GTB offers 
a different incentive structure to resolve the disparity of worldwide green-technology 
distribution. First of all, it establishes an informational base that was previously not 
available. Secondly, where technology transfer came more as a by-product in the 
CDM case, it is the overriding goal in the GTB case. Finally, developed countries 
subsidize green-technology transfer to developing country companies by buying 
emission permits from their respective government which then transfers the money 
back to them. The CDM mechanism does not have a similar provision (Seres 2007).   
5.3 Summary 
The GTB is a side-payment mechanism that has the goal to increase cooperation in 
a new climate change agreement that entails emission limits for both developed and 
developing countries. The assumption of an encompassing climate change 
agreement is a substantial but necessary one for the GTB to work. Otherwise, the 
working of resource markets described above would probably lead to more 
emissions globally. More importantly, the emission credit transfer mechanism 
developed above would not work. Another crucial assumption is the non-existence 
of a global permit market. Furthermore, within the regional permit markets not all 
sectors are regulated by emission caps.  
The GTB is designed to offer benefits to both developed and developing 
countries while raising the cost of non-participation in a new climate change 
agreement. First and foremost it addresses the problem of information flow between 
the developed and developing world on the issue of green-technologies. Too little 
information about what technology is available in the developed world and too little 
interest in adopting this technology to circumstances in the developing world are 
present today. The private sector plays an important role in this context, but global 
mechanisms reflect this only to a minor degree. To rectify this, firms in developed 
countries are offered several incentives. They receive extra emission permits 
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depending on how many emissions have been avoided in a developing country due 
to their technology. These permits can then be sold in the regional market or be 
used to reduce their obligatory abatement effort. This should be an incentive for 
both regulated and un-regulated companies to participate. If this incentive turns out 
to be insufficient to induce environmental R&D at a high enough level, developed 
country governments should consider direct subsidies in addition to the transfer of 
emission permits.    
Firms in developing countries have an interest in pressuring their 
governments to gain access to the GTB, as they profit from lower market prices 
from technology and potential secondary benefits from technology transfer, if they 
are regulated by emission caps. Unregulated companies receive a direct monetary 
subsidy in addition to a lower price for technology. This subsidy is equivalent to the 
amount of emissions avoided compared to the BAU-case times the price of permits 
in the regional market.  The underlying reason for the extra subsidy for unregulated 
companies is that they do not have a similar “pull” incentive to adopt cleaner 
technology as regulated companies. Developed country governments would 
shoulder most of the financial burden of the GTB since companies from developed 
countries are by and large responsible for the R&D of green-technologies.  
In conclusion, by establishing GTB developed country governments can 
potentially increase the likelihood of developing country participation in global 
abatement efforts, which is a pre-requisite for avoiding drastic climate change based 
on current emission projections. In order to assess the viability of the GTB to do so, 
the next section will employ non-cooperative game theory to see if it can strengthen 
the self-enforcing nature that a global climate change agreement must have.  
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6. The GTB Game 
6.1 The asymmetric Prisoner’s dilemma game 
To analyze whether the GTB idea has the potential to increase cooperation in a 
post-Kyoto climate change agreement this section will draw on results from non-
cooperative game theory. The choice to use non-cooperative theory is based on the 
discussion in section 2.2 about self-enforcing agreements. Countries are unlikely to 
reach an agreement in a cooperative setting as long as it is not in their self-interest, 
considering the actions of other participants out of their control. They will then only 
adhere to agreements if they derive a positive payoff from doing so, while taking the 
actions of others as given. The analysis will start out by setting the prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD) situation into the context of climate change negotiations. It will then 
proceed by including the technology transfer scheme described above as a strategy 
in order to see if this can help to reach and sustain the cooperative outcome. A 
further adjustment will be the introduction of asymmetries between the two players.  
6.1.1 Players and bargaining 
There are 2 players, a coalition of developed countries C and a coalition of 
developing countries A. This is a simplification as compared to the situation in 
chapter five were at least four parties were involved, an aggregate of firms and the 
government in developed and developing countries. Coalition members will adhere 
to the policy decided upon for the whole coalition. Internal bargaining problems due 
to an uneven distribution of benefits which might require compensatory transfers are 
assumed away.  
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6.1.2 The payoff function and the business as usual case 
The payoff function presented in this section adopted from Wagner (2001) will be 
modeled in terms of abatement only. This is assumed to be the only action variable 
for both players. All strategies lead to different levels of abatement. The payoff 
function for player C is then defined as follows:  
)()(),( CCACC qcqBqq     (1)
 
q=qA+qC, stands for abatement effort and subscripts C and A for the abatement 
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)(qB
0)(,0)( ii qB 22  ijiiij qqqBqq  . The 
benefit function is concave and increasing in abatement of any of the two players. 
The benefit of abatement is the avoidance of damages that would occur otherwise. 
is the cost function of abatement with the following properties: 
ACi ,
)( Cqc
22 )(,0)( Cqc CCC qqcq   In other words, the cost function is increasing and 
convex in own abatement effort. Both functions start at the origin, 00( )0(,0)  cB . 
Maximizing (1) with respect to the variable that the players control, their own 
abatement effort, yields the individual country’s’ optimality condition:  
0
)()(),( 



C
C
C
C
C
ACC
q
qc
q
qB
q
qq
 
(2) 
C
C
C
C
q
qc
q
qB


 )()(
 
(3) 
A
A
A
CAA
q
qc
q
qqB


 )(),(
 
(4) 
 
Marginal benefits of abatement for each country should equal marginal cost of 
abatement for each country in absence of any agreement specifying abatement 
levels, provided the other coalition’s strategy is considered fixed. This case will be 
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referred to as the business-as-usual case, representing the fully non-cooperative 
case in the PD-game below since both coalitions optimize their abatement only 
according to their own benefit. 
6.1.3 Asymmetries 
The two players in the PD-game are assumed to be asymmetric. Two factors define 
the asymmetry in this game. First of all, given a total level of abatement q=qA+qC,  
BA(q) will always be higher than BC(q)  .This asymmetry is introduced since the 
most recent reports on the impact of human induced climate change indicate that 
developing countries will suffer most from climate change and especially so since 
they have less financial means to adapt (Stern 2007; IPCC 2008a). Secondly, the 
level of abatement to be undertaken if one of the players or both cooperate is 
unequal. Player C, if cooperating, will be obliged to abate considerably more than 
player A. This assumption is based on the notion that developed countries are 
responsible for most of the emissions in the atmosphere today and therefore should 
carry most of the burden to achieve world-wide abatement. If a player decides to 
cooperate his abatement choice becomes discrete, as he will be bound by treaty 
obligations. If he chooses not to cooperate his decision will still be based on 
equations (3) and (4) 
6.1.4 Strategy space and the game in normal form 
The strategy space for player C is },{ NCCPSC  and the strategy space for player A 
is . If the cooperative strategy CP is played, a player has to abate an 
exogenously given amount which is assumed to be larger as compared to what 
each player would have abated without an agreement. Specifying abatement 
obligations in this fashion allows for the usage of the continuous benefit function to 
analyze the payoff from strategies, even if they represent discrete choices since the 
interest lies in the overall payoff which is defined by equation (2). Under strategy 
NC, both players choose their abatement levels according to equations (3) and (4). 
Situations where one player cooperates while the other defect can be considered as 
a situation with partial climate change agreements where only one region abates. 
The full cooperative situation {CP,CP} is equivalent to a global climate change 
},{ NCCPS A 
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agreement being in place where both developed and developing countries decrease 
their emissions. The game then looks as follows:  
Figure 6.1: The PD-Game 
 A  
C CP NC 
CP 4,7 -3,8 
NC 6,-1 0,0 
 
6.1.5 Payoff analysis and the Nash-equilibrium 
Payoffs on the left accrue to player C, payoffs on the right to player A. Payoffs here 
are modeled to be consistent with the assumptions made above. The result would 
not change with different numbers, as long as the relative difference between them 
is maintained. The Nash-Equilibrium in the one-shot situation considered here is 
{NC,NC}  as in the standard PD-game since both players have an incentive to 
deviate from the cooperative outcome as they can gain as long as the other player 
continues to cooperate. Knowing this, rational players will choose not to abate as 
they cannot rely on the cooperation of the other. The payoff in this situation for both 
players is {0,0}. Payoffs for both players are zero as this case represents the BAU-
scenario and no benefits or losses accrue to the players beyond what they would 
have done when strictly maximizing their own benefit. Due to the asymmetries the 
payoffs differ from the standard symmetric PD-situation. The following cell by cell 
analysis should give an overview of how they affect the payoffs.   
{NC,NC} to {NC,CP} 
Player A has now specific abatement obligations, which are assumed to be higher 
than what he would have abated without an agreement. This implies an increase in 
cost, but also increased benefits. Overall however, the increase in cost should 
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outweigh the increase in benefits as he has to deviate from his non-cooperative 
optimal choice and no abatement from C takes place. Benefits for C increase as he 
profits from A’s abatement while he does not have to incur extra cost.  
{NC,NC} to {CP,NC} 
Costs for C are substantially higher due to the obligatory abatement which is large 
relative to A’s obligations. Benefits for C increase as well, but he has to deviate from 
the optimality condition which leads to an overall negative outcome. Benefits for 
player A increase likewise considerably due to player C’s abatement while he bears 
no extra costs since he does not cooperate. 
{NC,NC} to {CP,CP} 
Benefits increase for both players due to the abatement that takes place, relatively 
more for player A due to the asymmetry of the benefit functions. Costs increase for 
both players as well since both have to carry-out obligatory abatement above what 
they would do in the absence of an international agreement. For player C the costs 
increase relatively more since he has more abatement to carry out. Therefore, C’s 
overall benefit is less than that of player A. 
The outcome in real world terms is that no global or partial climate change 
agreement is in place that would lead to abatement. As the strategy space available 
is similar to the one that was up for negotiation when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed 
upon, the outcome of the negotiations may seem similar to the situation where 
player C cooperates and A defects. Why would developed countries still cooperate? 
As described above some developed countries did in fact not join the protocol, most 
prominently the US. In many cases it is uncertain if abatement obligations under the 
protocol will be fulfilled. The tendency of countries since the Protocol has been 
active seems to have been a move towards the non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium. 
It seems therefore likely that the Kyoto Protocol did not provide sufficient incentives 
to sustain cooperation among developed players or offer sufficient incentives for 
developing countries to join. In the following section a game with the GTB offering 
new strategic choices will be considered to find out if this mechanism could provide 
incentives to sustain a cooperative outcome.  
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6.2 The GTB Game  
6.2.1 Cost/Benefit functions and the GTB 
The benefit function and the conditions that apply to it are still the same as in the 
PD-game, but changes occur to the cost function once the GTB is introduced. A 
general benefit that is assumed to accrue to both players when the GTB mechanism 
is setup is lower marginal abatement costs. The GTB encourages environmental 
R&D and the simplifying assumption is made here that more R&D leads to lower 
abatement costs thus:  
C
CC
C
CGTBC
q
qc
q
qc


 )()(/  and 
A
AA
A
AGTBA
q
qc
q
qc


 )()(/ , 
where C/GTB and A/GTB stand for the marginal cost for developed and developing 
countries respectively with GTB.  Player C gains additionally if the GTB is set up 
since he obtains emission permits from player A for transferring technology which 
means that he has to carry out less abatement. Abatement cost for player A 
increase since the overall allocation of permits does not change and a reduction in 
his emission permits leads to more abatement obligations and higher cost. 
Transactions costs that would most certainly occur under any such emission permit 
transfer mechanism are assumed away here. However, as player C has to abate 
substantially more than player A when cooperating, a decrease in cost is an 
important channel through which his willingness to cooperate can be furthered.  
6.2.2 Players and strategy space 
The players taking part in the GTB game are the same as before, a coalition of 
developed countries C and a coalition of developing countries A. The strategy space 
for player C is },,{ CPNCTSCPSC   and },{ NCCPS A  for A. CP-TS for player C 
implies that he faces obligatory abatement requirements as in the CP case 
described above and that the GTB mechanism will be setup by player C. CP-TS is 
only a strategic option for player C as the assumption is made that green-technology 
is pre-dominantly researched and developed in the countries that are assumed to be 
part to such a collation, Germany, US, Japan and France for example. CP for both 
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C and A implies that both have to carry out obligatory abatement but no GTB 
mechanism is setup. NC implies that both players will abate according to (3) and (4). 
The payoffs for the strategy combinations from the PD-game are unchanged. The 
normal form of the game then looks as follows 
 
Figure 6.2: The GTB-Game 
 A  
C CP NC 
CP-TS C11,A11 C21,A21 
CP 4,7 -2,8 
NC 6,1 0,0 
 
6.2.3 Payoffs, GTB and Nash-Equilibrium 
The goal of the following analysis is to find out what payoffs in cells {CP-TS,CP} and 
{CP-TS,NC} would have to be to constitute a Nash-Equilibrium.  For {CP-TS,CP} to 
be a Nash-equilibrium, deviation has to yield a lower payoff for both players than 
cooperation. This implies that C11>6, the payoff from cooperation for player C 
including GTB has to be higher than the payoff from playing NC while A continues to 
cooperate. Furthermore, A11>A21, the payoff for player A has to be higher than the 
payoff from defecting while C continues to cooperate.  
 Does the GTB offer sufficient incentives to fulfill these conditions? The 
following discussion is kept at an informal level due to the time limits of the Master 
Thesis. A definitive conclusion can only be reached with further specification of the 
cost and benefit functions. The results obtained below should serve as an indication 
for the reader where the most crucial frictions are.  
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 The GTB reduces compliance cost for player C as his marginal abatement 
costs are lowered due to more environmental R&D. In addition he receives some of 
A’s emission permits for the technology transfer. Therefore, he has to carry out less 
abatement and his costs are lowered. Compared to {CP,CP} player C should then 
have a higher payoff as his costs are reduced while benefits stay at the same level 
since global abatement does not change under the GTB. If the reduction in cost is 
sufficiently large, the GTB has the potential to make CP-TS the dominant strategy 
for player C when A plays CP.  
 Concerning player A, a first step is to analyze how his payoff changes when 
moving from {CP,CP} to {CP-TS, CP}. Compliance costs are lowered as player A 
profits from more environmental R&D. However, costs also increase as player A 
transfers emission permits to player C which increase compliance cost. Whether his 
payoff increases overall is therefore ambiguous. What about {CP,NC} in comparison 
to {CP-TS,NC}? {CP-TS,NC} should have the exact same payoffs for A as {CP,NC} 
since the GTB cannot work without obligatory abatement effort for player A. Thus 
A21=8.  
In summary, the discussion for player A seems to indicate that NC is the 
dominant strategy when C plays CP-TS. Since the payoff to player C when A does 
not cooperate is equal with or without the GTB, -2 in the matrix above, his dominant 
strategy if A plays NC is NC. The Nash-equilibrium would then be {NC,NC}. 
6.2.4 Secondary benefits 
The main market failure that the GTB tries to address is the lack of environmental 
R&D worldwide. More R&D, and the following transfer from developed to developing 
countries, will most likely not only replace brown technology; it will also lead to some 
potentially substantial secondary benefits. As mentioned in chapter one and five, 
these can include higher economic growth, a more reliable energy infrastructure, the 
reduction of other pollutants with a local impact, better health and the increased 
technical skills of employees. These potential benefits are not part of the simple 
payoff function above since they do not easily translate into abatement. If they 
would be modelled, the payoff to player A is likely to increase which might establish 
the fully cooperative solution as a new Nash-Equilibrium {CP-TS,CP}. But a caveat 
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is in order here since this result depends crucially on the exact modelling of the 
secondary benefits, which is not done here.  
6.3 Conclusion 
The results obtained in this section are tentative and should be confirmed with a 
formal analysis which was not feasible given the time limits of this thesis. However, 
an important result is that with the asymmetries assumed here, a difference in 
benefits of abatement and a difference in abatement obligations, the GTB 
mechanism as introduced in this game is not likely to help establish a Nash-
equilibrium in a game of international cooperation on a new climate change 
agreement. The GTB lowers the cost of compliance for the developed country 
coalition while the result for the developing country coalition is ambiguous. Important 
factors left out in the previous analysis are secondary benefits. Their potential 
positive impact could lead to the establishment of the fully cooperative outcome as a 
new Nash-equilibrium. Further issues that should be considered in a more elaborate 
model, indicating the need for further research, will now be addressed in the 
concluding section. 
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7. Summary 
This thesis has investigated if a technology transfer mechanism, different from 
currently operating ones, could help to increase cooperation under a new climate 
change agreement. A new agreement should be as globally encompassing as 
possible to avoid emission leakage via the working of resource markets and would 
therefore include emission limits for both developed and developing countries. The 
motivation for evaluating the issue from this perspective stems from the insight that 
the problem of human induced climate change faces two separate market failures: A 
largely unincorporated externality from greenhouse gases on the one hand and a 
lack of environmental R&D due to inconsideration of its global effects on the other 
hand. A priori, a technology transfer scheme under a global climate change 
agreement seems to have the potential to address both problems.  
 The analysis started out by evaluating current mechanisms to transfer 
technology, operating under the Kyoto Protocol and the APP. A result that emerged 
in the case of the Kyoto Protocol was that its mechanisms address technology 
transfer between developed and developing countries in a rather indirect fashion. 
Additionally, they do not fulfill optimality conditions when considering the two market 
failures mentioned above. The CDM suffers from bad incentives that lead to too high 
avoided emission claims from participating parties. Permit trading might lead to 
more R&D but probably not at a sufficient level and more importantly it does not 
address the issue of technology transfer. Since the Kyoto Protocol does not 
encompass all countries and furthermore does not cover all sectors in Annex I 
countries, emission reductions in one sector may lead to an increase in emissions 
elsewhere in the economy. The time-frame of the Protocol is most likely too short to 
induce long-term investment needed for some essential green-technologies to reach 
a marketable status. Emission cuts for Annex I countries are also far from sufficient 
to avoid a high probability of drastic climate change, which has been attributed to 
the consensus-treaty nature of the agreement. However, one should not forget that 
the Kyoto Protocol represents the first serious effort to address the issue of human 
induced climate change and that it was clear from the outset that the result would 
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not be perfect. It is nevertheless crucial to realize these short-comings when 
designing a new agreement.   
 By employing recent results from resource economic theory concerning the 
influence of the price of green-technologies on the extraction path of non-renewable 
resource relevant for the green-house effect, the argument was made that the APP 
does not address the issue of human induced climate change effectively. Without 
binding emission limits for its members it may actually worsen the situation and 
incentives to actually apply new green-technology are low. This is due to the likely 
price development of non-renewable resources when green-technologies are 
introduced which might actually lead to more greenhouse gas emissions. The 
sectoral approach concerning the development and transfer of technologies 
deserves credit and can serve as an input for the development of a more effective 
technology transfer scheme. A vital actor that both the Kyoto Protocol and the APP 
fail to include through economic incentives at a sufficient scale is the private sector. 
Without including this sector and its R&D capacity in an effective manner, it is 
unlikely that sufficient transfer of technology will ever take place.  
 To address the short-comings with respect to technology transfer that both 
agreements have, the GTB concept was introduced. The first goal of the scheme is 
to address the lack of information about the availability of green-technologies. For 
the GTB to be workable certain assumptions are vital: First of all, the overall amount 
of emission permits world-wide should not change under this arrangement. 
Secondly, I assume that there is a global permit market, but an imperfect one. The 
GTB offers incentives for both developed and developing country actors to engage 
in the transfer of technology, with technology suitable to conditions in developing 
countries. Realizing that the directionality of the transfer runs from North to South is 
crucial. The underlying reason for this pattern of R&D concerning green-
technologies has been established in chapter two. There, the conclusion was 
reached that environmental R&D takes by and large place in rich and democratic 
countries. Developed country actors can gain since they receive emission permits, 
which can be sold in the local permit market or used to reduce abatement 
obligations. Developing country actors not regulated by emission caps receive 
benefits in monetary form since their governments would buy emission credits 
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according to the amount of emissions avoided in the local permit market. These will 
then be bought by the developed country government and the funds would be 
transferred to the developing country entrepreneur. A benefit that accrues to both 
regulated and non-regulated actors in the developing country is a decrease in the 
price of green-technology. This follows from the working of market mechanisms if a 
subsidy is paid to developed country actors in the form of emission permits. Finally, 
there are potentially significant secondary benefits that accrue to the developing 
country actors such as higher economic growth, a more reliable energy 
infrastructure, the reduction of other pollutants with a local impact, better health and 
the increased technical skills of employees. Since I discovered no prior evaluation of 
exactly such a proposal during my research, the goal of the analysis carried out 
here was to introduce the reader to the basic incentives that underlie the GTB and 
show were the most important frictions lay. Undoubtedly, there are still a variety of 
issues that need further investigation. For example the issue of product piracy, 
potential negative effects of technology, the political feasibility of such a scheme and 
how to integrate such an approach with official development aid efforts. 
 Finally, a simple game theoretic analysis was carried out to determine if the 
GTB could potentially increase cooperation in a new climate change agreement. In 
the games analyzed two players participated, a coalition of developed countries, 
player C, and a coalition of developing countries, player A. A further assumption 
was the asymmetry of players. They are assumed to derive different benefits from 
abatement as well as receiving differing amounts of emission permits. The latter 
assumption leads to different abatement costs and makes side-payments a viable 
option from which both sides can profit. The analysis started with the asymmetric 
PD-situation where payoffs were modeled and based on the assumptions made.  As 
in the standard one-shot PD-game the non-cooperative outcome was the Nash-
equilibrium. In the following game, the GTB strategy was added to the developed 
country coalition’s strategy space. In order to determine if this could help to achieve 
and sustain a cooperative solution between the two players, an informal discussion 
about the requirements of the payoffs in order to make cooperation a dominant 
strategy was presented. For player C the result emerged that a sufficient reduction 
in costs due to the GTB could make cooperation with the GTB mechanism in place 
the dominant strategy. For player A the result was ambiguous since costs decrease 
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on the one hand due to more environmental R&D, but increase on the other hand 
due to transfer of emissions permits to player C. Since benefits do not change for 
player A when he moves from the non-cooperative strategy without the GTB to the 
one that includes it, the discussion pointed towards dominance of the non-
cooperative strategy for player A. Given A’s strategic choice, a rational response 
from player C would be to not cooperate, re-establishing the non-cooperative 
outcome as a Nash-Equilibrium as in the PD-game. In conclusion, the GTB game as 
modeled in chapter six was unlikely to help establishing a cooperative solution under 
a new climate change treaty with obligatory abatement for developing and 
developed countries.  
 Future research on this issue could address several concerns. First of all, the 
secondary benefits that could potentially accrue to player A when a technology 
transfer takes place are not part of the payoff function. It solely depends on 
abatement effort of the two players. Taking secondary effects into account could 
substantially increase the likelihood of player A to cooperate. Secondly, bargaining 
between firms and governments could be introduced before the negotiations 
between governments take place. This would make it a two-level game. Introducing 
this aspect might be more in line what can be expected in actual negotiations since 
companies are likely to do what they can to reduce abatement effort, exerting strong 
lobbying pressure at the national and international level. Thirdly, a numerical 
analysis specifying cost and benefit functions might be carried out. In this analysis 
the number of players should be increased, specifying individual countries and their 
characteristics. This should help determine the size of the cooperating coalition. 
Finally, further asymmetries could be introduced such as the ability of different 
developing countries to adopt green-technologies, which can have an impact on 
their benefit function 
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